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1 July 1985

NOTE TO: DCI
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SUBJECT: Qs and As from Richard Burt

This is for your information.


As you may know, last week Richard Burt asked for our emergency help in answering 21 questions from Senator Helms prior to Burt's SFRC confirmation vote Thursday, 27 June.

We put a little task force of good people on this project, worked with Richard Burt's people, and jointly produced a set of answers. We provided some of the answers, Burt's people provided some of the answers, and we coordinated on all of it -- including the classifications of each answer. A copy, together with a letter of transmittal, is attached. It is not perfect but it worked.

Mr. Burt decided that, for certain questions he wanted to use the artform demonstrated in the answer to question 6.

We were able to do all this in less than a working day because my predecessor set up a good system of files on Congressional Qs and As.

I hope this is helpful. If I can do more to assist you here, please call.



Douglas George
C/ACIS
ACIS-1314/85

cc: Comptroller
D/OLL



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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 26, 1985

~~UNCLASSIFIED (With SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL
NOCONTRACT/ORCON Attachments)~~

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed are Assistant Secretary Richard Burt's responses to the questions posed by Senator Helms at Mr. Burt's confirmation hearing on June 25. You will note that the answers to eighteen of the questions are classified and three are unclassified.

I would like to point out that many of the questions deal with intelligence matters that go beyond Mr. Burt's areas of responsibility and his direct knowledge. In addition, many of the questions deal with events prior to Mr. Burt's service as a government official.

As an official in the Reagan Administration, Mr. Burt has contributed to the reorienting of U.S. arms control policy toward seeking substantial reductions in offensive nuclear arms to equal, stabilizing and verifiable levels.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "W. L. Ball".

William L. Ball, III
Assistant Secretary

Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

The Honorable
Richard G. Lugar, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

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Q.1: Has classified U.S. intelligence data ever been revealed to the Soviets during the SALT process? If so, can it be made public? Has the SALT process jeopardized any U.S. intelligence sources and methods?

A: I am not aware that the U.S. Government ever knowingly authorized U.S. intelligence data which would harm our national security to be given to the Soviet Union during the SALT process. I was not, however, an official of the U.S. Government during the SALT negotiations and have not had the opportunity to review the entire classified record.

The Intelligence Community is an active participant in preparations for each round of arms control negotiations and is fully represented on our delegations. The Intelligence Community representatives take an active role in ensuring that sensitive information is not only protected from inadvertant disclosure to the Soviet Union, but that sensitive sources and methods are also fully protected.

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Q.2: Has the U.S. ever provided the Soviets photography of U.S. ABM sites and deactivated U.S. ICBM sites? Have the Soviets ever reciprocated with photography of any of their own installations?

A: The U.S. Government has not authorized the provision of photographs acquired by U.S. intelligence of Soviet facilities to the Soviet Union. Nor has the Soviet Union ever provided photography of their own installations.

In response to a Soviet charge that dismantling procedures had not been fully complied with at the Malmstrom ABM site, the U.S. on April 22, 1976 did provide photographs of the incomplete Malmstrom site. The photographs showed the condition of the buildings after the actions required under agreed procedures had been carried out.

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Q.3: Has the U.S. ever provided the Soviets with classified U.S. data on new U.S. Early Warning radars such as "Pave Paws"? Have the Soviets ever provided the U.S. with similar data?

A: The U.S. Component to the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) has responded to Soviet questions about Early Warning Radars such as Pave Paws using unclassified information from U.S. Government documents. The U.S. SCC Component has also called for reciprocal exchange of data on U.S. and Soviet radars.

The Soviets have provided some, less detailed data on radars which have been questioned by the U.S. SCC Component, including the radar at Krasnoyarsk which we believe is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

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Q.4: Have the Soviets ever charged the United States with deliberate concealment, which in effect is a violation of SALT I and SALT II?

A. The Soviets have charged the United States with deliberate concealment, which in effect violated the SALT I regime. For example, as the President's 1984 and 1985 Reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance noted, the Soviets have accused us of concealing work being done on missile silos.

In fact, temporary environmental shelters were erected to protect workmen from the elements during modernization of the silos. The United States removed the shelters after the Soviet complaint and engaged in no activity which was inconsistent with U.S. treaty obligations.

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Q.5: Given the well-known fact that the Soviets have expanded their strategic concealment, camouflage, and deception activities since 1972, despite the SALT I and II bans on deliberate concealment; and given U.S. recognition that the well-known Soviet camouflage net at a missile test range is acknowledged to have constituted deliberate concealment, has the U.S. ever charged the Soviets with deliberate concealment? Is it possible that the Soviets have charged the U.S. with deliberate concealment, while the U.S. has not similarly charged the Soviets?

A. The U.S. has raised with the Soviet component in the SCC a number of examples of deliberate concealment of the association of missiles and their launchers. We have also raised the issue of encryption of telemetry which impedes verification by National Technical Means.

The Soviets have consistently denied that they encrypt telemetry so as to impede verification and that they have made any attempt to deliberately conceal activities in contravention of the SALT I and II bans. The U.S. will continue to pursue these issues in the SCC, and will seek more effective verification provisions in future agreements.

Thus, it is incorrect to state that the U.S. has not charged the Soviets with deliberate concealment, while the Soviets have leveled such charges at the U.S.

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Q.6: Since SALT began in 1969, has intelligence data related to SALT ever been embargoed from and within the intelligence community, either temporarily or permanently? Has any such data also been withheld from Congress? Is there an Executive Order which provides that CIA shall receive all intelligence data collected within the U.S. government?

A: I was not an official of the U.S. Government during the period of the SALT negotiations, and have not had an opportunity to review the classified files personally.

I am informed that during the years up through the mid-1970s, a small number of pieces of intelligence were handled in a very restrictive manner. This data was provided to the Congress.

Executive Order 12333 provides, in essence, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall have access to all intelligence data within the U.S. Government.

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Q.7: If the U.S. tried to ban a missile the size of the Soviet SS-19 in 1972 under SALT I, in an attempt to limit Soviet counterforce capabilities, does the SS-19's deployment allowed under SALT I and II result in a reduction in U.S. national security? Does the Administration nevertheless believe that the Soviet SALT I compliance record does not reduce U.S. national security?

A: The Administration's concern over Soviet MIRVed ICBM capabilities, including the SS-19s, and this Administration's persistent efforts to limit that force in arms control negotiations is well known to the Senate. Soviet deployment of the SS-19, which occurred in the context of the agreed provisions of SALT I and II, has obviously been an important factor in the rapid growth of Soviet strategic capabilities, which the U.S. Strategic Modernization Program is designed to address.

In his February 1985 Report to the Congress on Soviet Non-compliance the President reported on two issues which have been thoroughly investigated:

-- mobile missile base construction at dismantled SS-7 ICBM sites; and

-- reconfiguration of YANKEE-class ballistic missile submarines.

Regarding mobile missile base construction at dismantled SS-7 ICBM sites, the U.S. Government judged that Soviet activity does not at present violate the agreed implementing procedures of the SALT I Interim Agreement. However, ongoing construction activities raise concern about compliance in the future and the U.S. will continue to monitor developments closely.

With regard to the YANKEE reconfiguration, the U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union's conversion of a dismantled SSBN into a submarine larger than the original, carrying modern, long-range cruise missiles is not in violation of its political commitment under the SALT I Interim Agreement, but constitutes a threat to U.S. and Allied security similar to the original YANKEE-class submarine.

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Q.8: Have the Soviets ever falsified a report of the number of ABM or ICBM launchers they have deactivated? Were all of those launchers required to be deactivated ever properly deactivated?

A: I am not aware that the USSR ever falsified a report on deactivation of launchers. I was not, however, an official of the U.S. Government during the SALT negotiations and have not had an opportunity to review the entire classified record.

However, during the recently concluded SCC session, the Soviets announced on the basis of "good will" that they had dismantled 20 fixed launchers (SS-11 silos). U.S. intelligence indicates that based on the date of the notification (April 10, 1985), only 18 of the 20 launchers were actually dismantled. Within several weeks after their announcement, the two remaining launchers were dismantled.

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Q.9: Have the Soviet  claimed that "trust" was involved in SALT compliance?

A: The Soviets regularly say that "trust" is involved in arms control verification and compliance.

The standard Soviet position on compliance is that national technical means of verification provide adequate means to verify the provisions of existing arms control commitments.

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Q.10: What was the time span between the first U.S. detection of each possible Soviet SALT violation, and its final resolution in the SCC? Did the U.S. ever acquiesce in the Soviet position?

A: There are, of course, a number of SALT-related compliance issues which have not been resolved. The development of a second new type of Soviet missile, the SS-X-25; the encryption of ballistic missile telemetry; and the probable deployment of SS-16 missiles at the Soviet base at Plesetsk are just three examples of issues we continue to raise in the SCC.

The Intelligence Community has long-standing instructions to provide prompt notification to appropriate interagency arms control groups of any possible Soviet violations of treaty commitments or political understandings. These findings are reviewed in the SCC Backstopping Committee and the Arms Control Verification Committee. Recommendations on whether to raise specific issues are made by those groups and decisions are made by the President.

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Q.11: Is there any classified evidence of Soviet negotiating deception in SALT? Was a classified study on Soviet SALT deception ever withheld or suppressed within the Executive Branch or withheld from the Congress?

A: I was not an official of the U.S. Government during the period of the SALT negotiations, and have not had an opportunity to review the classified files personally.

I am informed that there is evidence, albeit controversial, of Soviet negotiating deception in the arms control process, including SALT. Reports on this topic, because they contain highly sensitive intelligence information, receive only limited distribution. Such reports are provided to the Congress.

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Q.12: If Defense Department and military posture statements have recognized that during the 1969-1979 SALT decade the strategic balance has shifted against the U.S. and in Soviet favor, how has this shift in the balance affected U.S. leverage in enforcing Soviet compliance with SALT I?

A: Quite clearly the massive Soviet military buildup of the 1970's has had a significant impact on our entire strategic posture, including our ability to respond to the military consequences of Soviet arms control violations. While we continue to press the Soviets to correct their noncompliance through all appropriate diplomatic channels, we also recognize the possible need, in light of Soviet noncompliance, to respond with improvements in our own strategic forces.

The President's Strategic Modernization Program is designed to rectify the imbalances that developed during the 1970s. If fully funded and deployed, the Strategic Modernization Program will do much toward maintaining an equitable and stable balance.

In announcing his June 10 decision to retain our policy of not undercutting the SALT II Treaty, the President also decided that the United States will take proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance. He has directed the Department of Defense to undertake a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions which the U.S. could take to augment as necessary the U.S. Strategic Modernization Program as a proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, violations which the Soviets fail to correct.

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Q.13: Has there been any evidence in the past year suggesting Soviet violations of the SALT I ABM Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement, the BW Convention, the SALT II Treaty, and the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement of 1962?

A: The Administration's careful assessment of the most recent evidence relating to Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, with special reference to the SALT I ABM Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement, the BW Convention, and unratified SALT II Treaty, was the subject of two comprehensive reports from the President to the Congress, in both classified and unclassified versions, in January, 1984, and February, 1985. Those two reports reviewed a total of nineteen issues on which the evidence available indicated violations, probable violations or actions of great concern by the Soviet Union.

The Secretary of State has provided the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October, 1983, with an extensive classified briefing on Soviet activities in regard to the Kennedy-Khrushchev Accord of 1962.

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Q.14: Has there been any diplomatic challenge in the past year to Soviet violations of these agreements?

A: As the President has made clear in submitting to the Congress his reports on Soviet noncompliance and most recently on the occasion of his June 10th decision on building a mutual framework for interim restraint, the United States has consistently employed all appropriate diplomatic channels, including the U.S./Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), as well as Secretary of State Shultz's meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, to press the Soviet Union to explain and/or cease those activities which are of concern to us. In doing so, we have made it absolutely clear that we expect the Soviet Union to take positive steps to correct their noncompliance and otherwise to resolve our compliance concerns in order to maintain the integrity of existing agreements and to establish the positive environment necessary for the successful negotiation of new agreements.

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Q.15: Precisely how many Soviet SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs were fully dismantled according to SCC procedures each month between October 1975 and the present? How many SS-7/SS-8 ICBMs were required to be in fully deactivated status each month between October 1975 and the present? Were Soviet reports on their deactivation ever at variance with U.S. intelligence data? Was former Secretary of State Vance's public statement that the Soviets were in full compliance on deactivations in June 1976 correct?

A: I was not an official of the U.S. Government during the SALT negotiations and have not had the opportunity to review the entire classified record. Thus, I am not able to comment on Mr. Vance's statement.

I understand that on at least one occasion, Soviet reports on dismantling and deactivation of these missiles were at variance with U.S. intelligence data.

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Q.16: Were there any Soviet tests of surface-to-air missiles or radars in an ABM mode since 1975?

A: As part of the February, 1985, Report to the Congress on Soviet Compliance, the Administration examined whether the Soviet Union has tested concurrently SAM and ABM system components in violation of its legal obligation. That report judged, in essence, that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations was insufficient to assess fully the compliance of Soviet actions with ABM Treaty obligations.

Within the US/USSR Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), an additional Common Understanding has recently been signed in which each party agreed to refrain from launching strategic ballistic missiles to the area of a test range or from launching ABM interceptor missiles at that test range concurrent with the operation of air defense components located at that range. However, if such an event should occur it was agreed that the party which had the concurrent operation will as soon as possible, but within thirty days, provide notification to the other party describing the circumstances of the event.

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Q.17: Were any Soviet SAM missiles ever tested against Soviet tactical or strategic ballistic missiles?

A: As part of the February, 1985, Report to the Congress on Soviet Compliance, the Administration examined whether the Soviet Union has tested a SAM system or component in an ABM mode or given it the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory in violation of their legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. That Report noted the Soviet SA-X-12 system has been tested at least once against at least one type of short-range ballistic missile. The Report judged that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade was insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, this and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

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Q.20: Have the Soviets introduced ICBM equipment into a deactivated old ICBM complex in possible violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement? Have the Soviets introduced ICBM equipment at medium range ballistic missile complex, also in possible violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement? Have the Soviets introduced mobile equipment into a deactivated old ICBM complex?

A: As part of the February, 1985, Report to the Congress on Soviet Compliance, the Administration examined whether the Soviet Union has used former ICBM sites in a manner inconsistent with its political commitment under the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures. In particular, we have examined the construction of new missile bases, probably for the mobile SS-X-25 ICBM, at former SS-7 launch sites in the vicinity of Yoshkar-Ola and Yurya, dismantled under the terms of the Interim Agreement. That report judged, in essence, that this Soviet activity does not at present violate the agreed implementing procedures of the Interim Agreement. However, the report further noted that ongoing construction does raise concerns about compliance for the future and that the U.S. will continue to monitor this situation closely.

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Q.21: Are the reports of Soviet construction of large phased array battle management radars correct? Has this issue been raised with the Soviets?

A: As part of the February, 1985, Report to the Congress on Soviet Compliance, the Administration examined whether the Soviet Union's construction of a large phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk was in violation of the ABM Treaty. That report strengthened the judgment of the earlier 1984 Report to the Congress, and said that construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar constituted a violation of that Treaty's obligations in its associated siting, orientation and capability. The U.S. has raised its concerns over this radar in all appropriate diplomatic channels, including the US/USSR Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). We have pressed the Soviet Union to dismantle this radar.

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